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Abstract. One of the fundamental results in computability is the exis-
tence of well-defined functions that cannot be computed. In this paper
we study the effects of data representation on computability; we show
that, while for each possible way of representing data there exist incom-
putable functions, the computability of a specific abstract function is
never an absolute property, but depends on the representation used for
the function domain. We examine the scope of this dependency and pro-
vide mathematical criteria to favour some representations over others. As
we shall show, there are strong reasons to suggest that computational
enumerability should be an additional axiom for computation models.
We analyze the link between the techniques and effects of representation
changes and those of oracle machines, showing an important connection
between their hierarchies. Finally, these notions enable us to gain a new
insight on the Church-Turing thesis: its interpretation as the underlying
algebraic structure to which computation is invariant.
1 Introduction
Both historically and conceptually, computability and decidability arise as a
result of trying to formally deal with the way work in mathematics itself is
performed. In an attempt to provide a formalization for the work of a math-
ematician proving theorems and deriving results, several authors proposed re-
spective models, such as the Turing Machine [18] or Church’s λ-calculus [3]. The
arguably most important result deriving from this work is the proof that there
are mathematically well defined functions which cannot be computed by any of
these systems. The halting theorem [18] is one of the most well known forms of
this statement, particularly proving the incomputability of the so-called halting
problem. In close relation to this statement is Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem
[6] proving that no formal system capable of expressing basic arithmetic can be
⋆ The work was carried out when Juan Casanova was with the Escuela Polite´cnica
Superior, Universidad Auto´noma de Madrid; Simone Santini was supported in part
by the the Spanish Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia under the grant N. TIN2016-
80630-P, Recomendacio´n en medios sociales: contexto, diversidad y sesgo algor´ıtmico.
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both consistent and complete, a more general proof of the same underlying fact
that the halting theorem proves.
The classic concept of “degree of recursive unsolvability” introduced by Post
[13] appears as a result of extending the concept of reducibility, implicit in Tur-
ing’s work [19], to incomputable functions. Formally, an oracle machine is a
theoretical device that enables a Turing machine to compute an otherwise incom-
putable function (respectively, set) at any step of its computation, thus making a
whole new set of previously incomputable functions (r., sets) computable under
the new model, while leaving other functions (r., sets) incomputable. This intro-
duces a preorder relation among functions (r., sets) that enables the definition of
equivalence classes (the degrees of recursive unsolvability) and a partial ordering
among them [8]. The structure of this set has been the subject of intensive study,
much of it related to the properties of the Turing jump. The Turing jump is the
extension of the basic halting problem to Turing machines with oracle, provid-
ing an effective method for obtaining an incomputable function (r., set) for any
model of computation defined through a Turing machine with oracle. The clas-
sic 1954 paper by Kleene and Post [9] contains the fundamental results in this
area: the structure of the Turing degrees is that of a join-semilattice, for any
set A, there are ℵ0 degrees between a and a′. The global structure of the set of
degrees of recursive unsolvability, D, has been the object of a significant amount
of work, especially in the period 1960–1990 [12,15,16,17]. Notable results include
the fact that every finite lattice is isomorphic to an initial segment of D [10] and
that every finite Boolean algebra [14] and every countable linear order with least
element [7] can be embedded in an initial segment of D. The strongest result in
this area was obtained in [1]: every initial element of an upper semi-lattice of
size ℵ1 with the countable predecessor property occurs as an initial segment of
D.
A different set of questions arise if we pose some restrictions on the general
Turing reducibility. By limiting the access to the oracle one obtains several types
of strong reducibilities [11], among which the most significant are the truth-table
[4] and enumeration [5] reducibilities.
However, while representation is an arguably omnipresent concept in all kinds
of computability and computer science work, little specific research has been
carried about its effects in computability of functions (respectively, sets) from a
purely abstract and formalism-centred point of view. In this article, we examine
this and related ideas, motivated by a small set of examples, introduced at the
beginning of the text, that show that, without further formal constraints, the
choice of the way data is represented in any computation formalism is in principle
a trascendental decision that greatly affects the notion of computability.
Following the examples, we provide a short and straight to the point representation-
free definition of the Turing machine formalism which allows us to restate some
of the most common results in computability theory in absolutely formal terms,
with no dependency on the representation chosen. The extremely formal charac-
ter of these results makes them insufficient for answering the common questions
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in computability, and thus, in the following section we introduce a formal defi-
nition of representation along with some basic derived concepts and results.
We then define two related but not identical partial ordering structures be-
tween representations (transformability and computational strength), which en-
able us to prove the two main results of the article. These results trace the
boundaries on the effect that representation may have on computability and
provide insight on the essential elements of computability that are in closest
relation with the admittedly odd effects of representation changes shown in the
introductory examples (namely, computational enumerability of sets and domain
restriction of functions). From these results we conclude that some of the most
counter-intuitive and consistency-defying issues raised by representation changes
can be dealt with by restricting the definition of computability, however leav-
ing some of the important effects of representation on computability inevitably
remaining.
Finally, motivated by the resemblance of the effects of representations to
those of oracle machines and of the relations between representations to the
hierarchy of degrees of recursive unsolvability, we study the relation between
these two concepts in two different ways. First, we show that the hierarchy of
degrees of recursive unsolvability does not correspond to the hierarchy of the so-
called representation degrees, but have a strong connection with them. Second,
we show that all the definitions and results regarding representations introduced
in this article can be naturally and easily extended to computability with oracle
machines.
As a last consideration, we examine the relation that the Church-Turing
thesis and related concepts have with the ideas introduced throughout the article.
2 Some definitions
Let F be the set of all functions defined on countable sets. Given a function f ,
we indicate as usual with Dom(f) the set of values for which f is defined and
with f(Dom(f)) = Rg(f) the set of values that are the image of elements of
Dom(f). The restriction f|A of f to A ⊆ Dom(f) is the function defined on A
such that for all x ∈ A, f|A(x) = f(x).
The set of functions (A→ B) is defined in the usual way
(A→ B) = {f ∈ F
∣∣A ⊆ Dom(f) ∧ Rg(f) ⊆ B} (1)
We shall use a square bracket to indicate that a set coincides with the domain
or range of a function, so we shall define
[A→ B] = {f ∈ F
∣∣A = Dom(f) ∧ Rg(f) = B} (2)
with the obvious meaning for [A → B) and (A → B]. Note that, of course,
[A→ B] ⊆ (A→ B).
* * *
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In order to ground the intuition that drives this article, namely that rep-
resentations bear some relevance for computability, we shall present here two
examples, which we shall use throughout the paper.
Example I:
Consider the function eq ∈ [N × N → {0, 1}] that compares its two argumens,
defined as eq(m,n) = if m = n then 1 else 0.
Consider now two representations of pairs of natural numbers: in the first
representation, one of the numbers is coded to the left of the initial head position
(the least significant digit closest to the initial head position), and the other
number is coded to the right of the initial head position, symmetrically, both in
binary code, with no additional information. In the second representation, they
are also represented one in each direction from the initial head position, but in
unary code (n is coded as n+ 1 “1”s followed by zeroes).
It is easy to see that in the first representation, eq is not computable. For
assume there exists a Turing machine φ which succesfully compares two numbers
in binary representation. Let n be any natural number. Run φ with the binary
representation of (n, n). Since it computes eq, it must halt with a positive result
after a finite number of computation steps. Write sn ∈ N for the number of steps
φ executes before halting with input (n, n). Now consider any natural number
m such that m 6= n but m = n mod 2sn . That is, m and n have the same sn
least significant binary digits. An infinite amount of such numbers exist. If we
run φ with (m,n) as input, it will execute the first sn steps, in which the head
cannot go any further from the initial position than sn cell positions. Thus, all
cells inspected by φ during this execution are equal to the ones inspected when
running with input (n, n). Therefore, φ must necessarily halt after sn steps,
with a positive result. However, m 6= n. This proves that φ does not succesfully
compare any two numbers.
Note that we are actually proving something stronger: no finite computability
model (a model that can’t do an infinite number of operations at the same time)
can compare two numbers in finite time using the first representation.
However, in the latter representation, the function is trivially computable.
Intuitively, the machine runs alternatively in both directions until it encounters
the last ”1” on one side. If it is also the last one on the other side, they are equal,
otherwise, they are distinct. Note that the problem with the former representa-
tion disappears if the representation is slightly changed so that, as it happens
in all practical computers, the set of possible tape configurations is finite or the
boundaries of the tape are marked with a special symbol.
Example II:
Consider the halting problem: find a Turing machine φH such that, given any
other Turing machine φ and an input tape τ , φH always halts and indicates
whether φ with input tape τ halts or not. One of the fundamental and best
known textbook theorems in computing science says that no such TM exist.
Consider the typical representation for which the halting theorem is proved:
The TM is represented on one side of the tape, codified as a set of quintuples
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depicting its transition function, and the input tape is on the other side, folded
so that it can be represented on just one side of the global tape. In this repre-
sentation, the halting problem is undecidable.
However, the halting problem, in its most general form, is an abstract prob-
lem about the properties of certain sets of Turing machines and input tapes. In
order to consider its computability, we had to indicate that a Turing machine is
represented by the quintuples of its transition function. But a TM is an abstract
mathematical object that can be codified on a tape in different ways. For exam-
ple, we can extend the previous representation by placing an additional symbol
at the initial head position. This symbol will be 1 if the input Turing machine
halts with the given input tape, and 0 otherwise.
In this representation, the TM φH exists trivially. Therefore the halting prob-
lem is decidable.
* * *
Remark 1: One possible objection to the previous example is that we have ob-
tained a solution to the halting problem only because we have a “non-computable”
representation, that is, a representation in which a non-computable quantity is
computed and made explicit.
We must stress, however, that computability is defined only for quantities
represented on tape, that is, only once the abstract entities involved have un-
dergone the process of representation and its computability is thus a strictly
formulable fact in the Turing machine formalism (or any other computation for-
malism). To say that a representation is non-computable (or, for that matter,
that it is is computable) is meaningless, as representation is the prerequisite
necessary so that one can define computability.
The purpose of this article is to study the mathematical aspects of repre-
sentation and their relation to computability, in the light of the two examples
above and related facts. We will offer a theoretical justification as to why the
first representation offered for the halting problem is more “reasonable” than
the second. This justification will allow us to acquire an insight of the math-
ematical properties of computation formalisms and to better understand how
representations affect the notion of computability.
3 Definitions and formalism
Throughout most of this paper we shall consider representations in the context
of computation with Turing Machines, as it is arguably the best known com-
puting model, and one in which the explicit separation between the computing
device (the machine) and the input data (the tape) makes the representation
problem clearer and easier to work on. Towards the end of the paper we will
offer a discussion about how the choice of formalism affects the discussions and
conclusions offered here and discuss briefly how formalism is related to a choice
of representation.
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Many interesting results in computability can be formulated meaningfully as
statements on sets of tapes or strings, without the need for representations. We
will discuss these results later in this section. Most of the results of this section
are very well known facts whose proofs can be found in textbooks. We shall
therefore simply remind the results, skipping the proofs.
We shall indicate with TΣ the set of tapes on a finite alphabet Σ with a finite
number of non-blank symbols; whenever the alphabet in question is clear from
the context, we shall omit the subscript Σ; tapes will be indicated as τ , τ ′ (or
τ1), etc. As usual, given a tape τ , we shall indicate with φ(τ)↓ the fact that the
machine φ stops on input τ and with φ(τ)↑ the fact that φ doesn’t stop.
Functions from tapes to tapes are especially interesting here as they are
the only ones for which Turing computability can be defined, as observed in
Remark 1. A Turing machine, qua machine can take any tape as input and do
something with it (possibly never stopping, of course) but in general a function
f ∈ (T → T ) will be defined only for a subset of tapes. Therefore, a Turing
machine qua implementation of a function f is defined only in the domain of
that function.
Representations often come with a restriction in the set of “valid” tapes.
In example 1, any tape can be interpreted as the binary representation of two
numbers, but only tapes consisting in a collection of consecutive “1”, with “0”
everywhere else can be interpreted as the unary representation of numbers. A
TM φeq that implements a comparator on this representation would of course
work on any tape, in the sense that whatever may be the input tape the TM
φeq would operate, but on these tapes φeq would not be an implementation of
the comparator function.
Definition 1. Let Q,P ⊆ T ; a function f ∈ [Q→ P ) is computable if there is
a TM φ such that
τ ∈ Q⇒ φ(τ) = f(τ) (3)
Definition 2. Let Q,P ⊆ T ; a function f ∈ [Q → P ) is partially computable
(p.c.) if it is computable and
τ 6∈ Q⇒ φ(τ)↑ (4)
Definition 3. A function f ∈ [Q → P ) is total computable (t.c.) if it is p.c.
and Q = T .
We shall indicate with M the set of computable functions, and with a doubly
pointed arrow the fact that a specific function is computable, that is, f ∈ [Q։
P ] entails that f is computable, that is:
[Q։ P ] = M ∩ [Q→ P ] (5)
whenever such an arrow appears in a diagram, the diagram will be said to com-
mute if, for each doubly pointed arrow there is a computable function that
makes the diagram commute in the traditional sense. The following theorem is
the functional formulation of the standard result on the composability of Turing
machines.
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Theorem 1. Let f ∈ [Q ։ P ) and g ∈ (P ։ R], P ′ = Rg(f) ∩ Dom(g),
Q′ = f−1(P ′) and R′ = g(P ′), then the restriction of g ◦ f to Q′ is computable:
(g ◦ f) ∈ [Q′ ։ R′] (6)
Let ν, o ∈ T be any two tapes with ν 6= o; we shall call these the yes and no
tapes.
Definition 4. The characteristic function χA ∈ [T → T ) of a set A ⊆ T is the
function
χA(τ) =
{
ν if τ ∈ A
o if τ 6∈ A
(7)
Definition 5. The set A ⊆ T is computable if χA is computable.
Definition 6. A set of tapes A ⊆ T is computationally-enumerable-A (c.e.-A)
if the restriction of χA to A, χA|A ∈ [A→ {ν}] is p.c., that is, if there is a TM
φ such that
τ ∈ A⇒ φ(τ) = ν
τ 6∈ A⇒ φ(τ)↑
(8)
Definition 7. A set A ⊆ T is computationally-enumerable-B (c.e.-B) if there
is a partially computable function f ∈ [A → A] and a tape τ0 ∈ A such that
for each τ ∈ A there is i ∈ N such that τ = f i(τ0); the function f is called the
enumerator of the set.
Theorem 2. A set A ⊆ T is c.e.-A iff it is c.e.-B
Because of this theorem, we can call sets with these properties simply com-
putationally enumerable, or c.e.
* * *
So far, we have considered TMs working on arbitrary sets of tapes. However,
example 1 shows that we should exert caution in choosing our sets of tapes, lest
we be unable to compute very fundamental operations, such as comparing the
representations of two numbers.
At this point, we are still considering tapes qua tapes, without assuming
that they are the representation of anything else. Even so, however, it seems
obvious that there is a certain number of properties that a “reasonable” set of
tapes must satisfy if we want to do some reasonable computation with them. If
we do not limit the set of tapes that we are considering, example 1 shows that
we can’t even determine whether two parts of a tape are equal: trying to do
some meaningful computation in these circumstances would be a daunting task,
exacerbating the pointlessness of doing so. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to offer a theoretical justification of the properties that we assume to hold for
a set of tapes, but some partial pragmatic justification can be derived from the
way in which we shall use these properties in the remainder of this paper.
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Some fundamental operations, such as comparison and copy, require the ca-
pacity to represent pairs of tapes (or, more in general, tuples of tapes) on a single
tape. To this end, we consider a tape bijection:
〈 , 〉 : T × T → T (9)
such that the following operations are computable:
Duplicate: δ : τ 7→ 〈τ, τ 〉
Swap: σ : 〈τ, τ ′〉 7→ 〈τ ′, τ 〉
Projection: pi1 : 〈τ, τ ′〉 7→ τ
Partial application: α1[f ] : 〈τ, τ ′〉 7→ 〈f(τ), τ ′〉
Any two such bijections are computationally equivalent under the definitions
given in section 4.1.
We assume that we can combine TMs in such a way that we can detect
when one of them enters an accepting state and continue the computation con-
sequently. In particular, we assume that we can define a TM that recognizes
whether its input is the same as a constant tape τ (encoded in the stucture of
the machine) and a TM (called eq) that, given a tape containing 〈τ, τ ′〉 accepts
if τ = τ ′ and rejects if τ 6= τ ′.
The second projection pi2 and the partial application on the second element
of a bijection α2(f) can be defined in terms of the basic operations and the
composition.
All the operations that we need in order to prove the results of this paper can
be defined in terms of these. The proof of this fact is easy (one only has to show
how to build the operations) but technical and we omit it, as it is peripheral to
the contents of the paper.
Under these assumptions, but conditioned to them, more of the typical results
can be proven.
Theorem 3. If f ∈M and Dom(f) is c.e. then Rg(f) is c.e. Furthermore, if f
is injective, then f−1 ∈ [Rg(f)։ Dom(f)] is computable.
Note that the function f−1 is computable only on Rg(f): the theorem doesn’t
guarantee that this set be computable.
The set of tapes T is computationally enumerable. Given an enumerator
E ∈ [T ։ T ] and an initial tape τ0, for a given tape τ , define #τ = n (n ∈ N)
if τ = En(τ0). As we will see in the following, this is equivalent to considering a
representation of natural numbers which allows the computation of the successor
function.
The set of TMs is also countable. One can thus consider the mth Turing
machine φm, for m ∈ N under a certain enumeration. In order to allow the use
of a universal Turing Machine, the enumeration that we use must allow us, given
a tape with the representation of a number m on it, to execute φm. Unless we
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state the contrary, the standard enumeration of Turing machines which we will
consider will have this universality property.
Given a TM φe (under a particular enumeration of Turing machines), e ∈ N,
define
We = {τ ∈ T |φe(τ)↓} (10)
We indicate with We,n, e, n ∈ N the set of tapes that φe accepts after n steps.
Theorem 4. A set A ⊆ T is c.e. iff A = ∅ or A is the range of a computable
function.
Finally, we give a version of the halting theorem which can be formulated in
exclusive terms of Turing machines.
Theorem 5. Let K = {τ |φ#τ (τ)↓}. K is not computable
Proof. Suppose K has a computable characteristic function χK ; define
f(τ) =
{
E(φ#τ (τ)) if χK(τ) = ν
o if χK(τ) = o
(11)
then f ∈M. Thus, we know that there exists τ0 such that for all τ ∈ T , φ#τ0(τ)↓
and f(τ) = φ#τ0(τ) but, for all τ such that φ#τ (τ) ↓, f(τ) = E(φ#τ (τ)) 6=
φ#τ (τ). In particular, φ#τ0(τ0)↓ and thus f(τ0) 6= φ#τ0(τ0). This contradiction
proves that K must be not computable.
This theorem shows that not all undecidability can be whisked away with
a suitable choice of representation, the way we have done in example 2. Un-
decidable problems can be defined based purely on tape computation, without
assuming that the tapes are representations of abstract sets.
4 Representations
Having established a computation formalism and some basic results, we can now
offer a formal definition of representation.
Definition 8. A representation of an abstract set A into the set of tapes T is
an injective function a ∈ (A→ T )
The image of A under a is the set of tapes a(A) ⊆ T . Note that if a is a
representation of A and A′ ⊆ A, then a is also a representation of A′ but its
properties as a representation of A might be quite different from its properties
as a representation of A′. For example, the set a(A) might be c.e. while a(A′)
may fail to be. As we’ll see in the following, this fact has quite far-reaching
consequences.
The set T is countable and, since representations are required to be injective,
the abstract set A is also countable: we can’t represent any set with cardinality
higher than ℵ0.
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Definition 9. Given a function f ∈ [A→ B] and two representations a and b of
A and B, respectively, a representation of f is the function fab : [a(A)→ b(B)]
such that the following diagram commutes
A
f //
a

B
b

a(A)
fab
// b(B)
If fab ∈ M, then we say that f is computable in the pair of representations a,
b. We shall indicate with M(a, b) the set of functions computable in (a, b).
Remark 2: Note that even if A = B we don’t assume necessarily that a = b: the
same set can be represented in two different ways as arguments and as result of
the function. If A = B and a = b, we can abbreviate M(a, a) as M(a).
On the other hand, we can assume that A = B and use only one represen-
tation. If A 6= B, and given representations a and b we can always consider the
set C = A⊔B (disjoint union) and a representation c such that c(a) = a(a) and
c(b) = b(b), if a ∈ A and b ∈ B. If for certain a ∈ A and b ∈ B, a(a) = b(b), then
we can consider a partially disjoint union of A and B in which we consider that
a = b. Using just one set and one representation for input and output becomes
particularly natural when considering that most computations are to be com-
posed, and they cannot be composed if they are on different sets. In other words,
usual computation is defined for functions (N → N) which can be chained.
Remark 3: The representation of a function is always defined: a is injective in
a(A) and therefore invertible, so we have fab = b ◦ f ◦ a−1. The representation,
however, may fail to be computable.
Computability is not an immediately transferred property. Consider two func-
tions f1, f2 ∈ [A→ B] in M(a, b), and assume that f1 ∈M(a′, b′). This doesn’t
entail that f2 ∈ M(a′, b′). To see this, consider examples 1 and 2. The identity
function is computable in both representations (it is computable in any repre-
sentation), but the comparator in example 1 and the halting decision function
in example 2 are computable only in one of them.
Lemma 1. The identity function of any set is computable in any representation.
Proof. The Turing machine with just one accepting state computes the identity.
Lemma 2. Let A be a finite set. Let f ∈ [A→ A) be any function on this set.
Then, f is computable in any representation a of A.
Proof. For each a ∈ A, we can build a Turing machine φa such that, given the
representation of another element a(a′) ∈ a(A), checks whether a(a) = a(a′).
Since A is finite, we can build a Turing machine which executes all machines φa
on any input a′. Since a′ ∈ A, then one and only one of those machines will have
a positive result. If the Turing machine with positive result was φa, then a
′ = a
and thus f(a′) = f(a). Write f(a) in the result.
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Lemma 3. Let f ∈ [A → A) be a constant function. Then, f is computable in
any representation a of A.
Proof. Let {x} = Rg(f). Consider τ = a(x). There exists a Turing machine
which replaces any input tape for the constant tape τ .
Remark 4: Lemma 3 requires the assumption that the comparator be computable
or at least that there exists a way to verify when all the input has been read.
Consider the binary representation considered in example 1. Replacing the input
tape with a constant tape is not a computable problem in such representation.
Even if the boundaries of the constant tape are previously know, the boundaries
of the input tape are not, and thus it is not possible to decide when all of the
input tape’s extra data have been erased.
Lemma 2 does not require these assumptions, however, as we are not im-
plementing a general comparator but rather a comparator for a constant tape,
which can be implemented in any representation.
With these definitions at hand, consider example 2 again. The usual proof
of the halting problem fails in this case because the new representation doesn’t
necessarily allow us to carry on the manipulations that the proof of the theorem
requires. In particular, given the pair 〈φ, τ 〉, the theorem assumes, by reductio
ad absurdum, the existence of a TM φh implementing a function h such that
h(〈φ, τ 〉) =
{
1 if φ(τ)↓
0 if φ(τ)↑
(12)
The diagonalization argument then assumes that given a tape τ , we execute
h(〈τ, τ 〉); the argument therefore assumes that the representation used for the
pair 〈φ, τ 〉 allows us the computation of the function
τ 7→ 〈τ, τ 〉 (13)
but if we represent the pair as 〈〈φ, τ 〉, b〉, where b is the solution of the halting
problem for φ and τ , then the function
τ 7→ 〈〈τ, τ 〉, b〉 (14)
is computable only by solving the halting problem, and the argument becomes
circular.
Most of the well known results in computability theory are expressed in terms
of sets of natural numbers. We are now in the condition to express them again
but, this time, relative to the representation used. We shall consider here only
the concepts that we shall use in the following. We shall consider the set A that
we are representing as fixed.
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Definition 10. The domain of the TM φe in a representation x is
W xe = {a|a ∈ A ∧ φe(x(a))↓} (15)
Definition 11. If U ⊆ A, and a and b are representations of A and B, respec-
tively; a function f ∈ [U → B] is p.c. in the representations a, b if there is e ∈ N
such that
x ∈ U ⇒ φe(a(x)) = b(f(x))
x 6∈ U ⇒ φe(a(x))↑
(16)
Clearly, partially computable functions are computable functions.
Definition 12. A function f ∈ [A → B] is total computable in the representa-
tions a, b if it is p.c. and a(A) = T .
Computability and enumerability of sets are extended in the obvious way
through the computability of their characteristic functions. However, note that
given a set A and a representation a of A, a(A) need not be necessarily c.e.. This
makes some basic and intuitive results become false when extended, as they rely
on the enumerability of T . For example, if a set B ⊂ A is computable under
representation a (that is, the function χB ∈ [A → {ν, o} ⊂ A] is computable
under representation a); then B need not be necessarily computationally enu-
merable. This suggests that enumerability might be (along with comparation,
duplication and the other aforementioned elemental functions) another reason-
able hypothesis to require for a representation. We will come back to this idea
further on.
4.1 Relations between representations
Definition 13. Let x and y be two representations of a set A: x is (computa-
tionally) transformable in y (y  x) if there is a function f ∈ [x(A)։ y(A)] such
that y = f ◦ x, viz. such that
x(A)
f

A
x
==④④④④④④④④
y !!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈
y(A)
(17)
commutes.
Remark 5: If we drop the computability requirement, then the function f always
exists and is unique in [x(A) → y(A)], since the representations are one-to-one
and onto. The previous definition, therefore, is tantamount to requiring that
y ◦ x−1 ∈M.
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* * *
Definition 14. Two representations x and y are transformationally equivalent
(x
t
∼ y) if x  y and y  x.
Remark 6: Transformability is transitive, as can be seen from the commutativity
of the following diagram and by the fact that M is closed under composition.
x(A)
f

g◦f

A
x
==④④④④④④④④ x′ //
x′′
!!❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
❈❈
x′(A)
g

x′′(A)
(18)
Therefore
t
∼ is an equivalence relation. Moreover,  induces a partial ordering
on the equivalence classes.
Theorem 6. Let x, y be representations of a set A. If y  x and x(A) is c.e.,
then y
t
∼ x.
Proof. Since y  x, there is a transformation f ∈ [x(A) ։ y(A)] and since x(A)
is c.e., by theorem 3, there is f−1 ∈ [y(A)։ x(A)] (also computable). Therefore
x  y and x
t
∼ y.
This theorem gives us some indications on the hierarchy induced by the rela-
tion ; it tells us that all representations whose range is c.e. are at the bottom
of the hierarchy: they are computationally transformable only in relations equiv-
alent to them. This is no longer the case if we drop the c.e. requirement.
While transformability is an easy to understand and sound concept, it fails
to express all the concerns on computability of representations we are trying
to consider here. We introduce here another relation which is neither generally
stronger nor weaker than the transformability relation.
Definition 15. Let x and y be two representations of a set A; x is computation-
ally stronger than y (written y ⊆ x) if M(y) ⊆M(x).
That is, x is computationally stronger than y if all functions computable in
the representation y are also computable in the representation x. This induces,
of course, another equivalence relation and a partial ordering among equivalence
classes.
Definition 16. Two representations x and y are computationally equivalent
(x
c
∼ y) if x ⊆ y and y ⊆ x.
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Definition 17. Two representations x and y are incomparable (x||y) if neither
x ⊆ y nor y ⊆ x.
Example III:
We will provide a new, more technical formulation of example 2, now that we
have the necessary concepts. Let c be the standard representation of N, in which
a number n is represented by a string of n + 1 symbols “1” followed by a “0”.
Build a representation y as follows. Define the function f(n) as
f(n) =
{
1 if φn(n)↓
0 if φn(n)↑
(19)
Define
y(n) = 〈c(n), c(f(n))〉 (20)
It is clear that y(N) is not c.e. and that c  y, since c = pi1 ◦ y and pi1 is
computable in y. On the other hand, it is not c
t
∼ y, as in y one can compute
f(n) simply as
y(n) 7→
{
〈c(0), c(f(0))〉 if pi2(y(n)) = c(0)
〈c(1), c(f(1))〉 if pi2(y(n)) = c(1)
(21)
while in c this is not possible (as proved by the undecidability of the halting
problem).
* * *
The previous example shows that the hierarchy established by the relation
 is not trivial.
Example IV:
As we have already mentioned, this paper is framed mostly in the context of
the Turing model of computation, that is, using Turing machines. However, the
concept of representations and the issues that derive from it are not limited to
Turing Machines. Here we give an example that hints at the generality of rep-
resentation by discussing briefly the halting problem in the context of Church’s
λ-calculus.
While the Turing model has two elements (namely, the machine, which im-
plements the computing algorithm and the tape, which contains the input and
output data), λ-calculus defines a single concept: the λ-funtion. Data must be
represented as λ-functions on which other λ-functions operate. Computation is
done through function application, and it stops (if it stops) when the expression
is reduced to a normal form (see [2] for details). An expression that cannot be
reduced to normal form is in a sense the equivalent of a Turing machine that
never stops. The halting problem in the context of λ-calculus can therefore be
expressed as follows:
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Is there a λ-function H (the halt detector) such that, given any λ-
function L (algorithm) and another λ-function I (input),H detects whether
L, when given I as input, has a normal form (halts)?
Here, “detecting” means that H gives two possible results, one being the
’yes’ answer (a λ-function which we will label ν) and the other the ’no’ answer
(o). The function H must work on two parameters, namely L and I. These
two parameters will be expressed by considering the λ-function λa.aLI as the
representation of the tuple (L, I), which is then evaluated by feeding it the
function which must be evaluated on L and I. That is, for any lambda function
F , F (L)(I) = (λa.aLI)(F ).
Under this representation, the halting problem is known to be undecidable,
a fact derived from the equivalence between λ-calculus and Turing machines.
Consider, however, an alternative representation.
We shall represent the tuple (L, I) as the lambda function λa.aLIh, where h
is ν if L evaluated on I has normal form, and o if it does not. This is, of course,
the same ’trick’ used in the Turing machine formalism.
In this representation, H can easily be computed with the function
λm.m(λx.λy.λz.z).
In particular,
(λm.m(λx.λy.λz.z))(λa.aLIh) = (λa.aLIh)(λx.λy.λz.z)
= (λx.λy.λz.z)(L)(I)(h)
= h.
* * *
The examples that we have presented so far show a common pattern: a rep-
resentation is improved not by a semantic change that uses additional properties
of the abstract set hitherto not used, but by a change internal to the space of
representations that can be carried out independently of the abstract set that
we are representing (adding delimiting characters, including the result of certain
functions, etc.). This pattern is general, and reveals a fundamental property of
representation improvement.
Let a, a′ be two representations of A. Let f ∈ [A → A] and fa, fa′ be the
two corresponding representations of f . We then have
a′(A)
fa′ // a′(A)
A
a′
OO
a

f // A
a′
OO
a

a(A)
fa // a(A)
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The composition x = a′ ◦ a−1 is an endorepresentation: a representation of T
into T : fx is a representation of fa3. Note that if f ∈M(a) and f ∈M(a′), then
fa ∈M(x). The reverse is also true: if f ∈M(a) and fa ∈M(x), then f ∈M(a′).
Theorem 7. Let x and y be two representations of a set A. Then, x is computa-
tionally stronger than y if and only if x ◦ y−1 ∈ [y(A)→ x(A)], as an endorepre-
sentation of y(A) ⊂ T is computationally stronger than the trivial representation
of y(A) (the identity function idy(A)).
Proof. Let y ⊆ x. Let f ∈ [y(A) → y(A)) such that f ∈M(idy(A)) ⊂M. Consider
the function g = y−1 ◦ f ◦ y ∈ [A→ A), f = gy ∈M. Therefore, g ∈M(y). Since
y ⊆ x, then g ∈M(x), that is, gx = x ◦ g ◦ x
−1 = x ◦ y−1 ◦ f ◦ y ◦ x−1 = fx◦y−1 ∈M,
and f ∈M(x ◦ y−1).
Now let idy(A) ⊆ x ◦ y
−1, and let f ∈ [A→ A) such that f ∈M(y). Consider
g = fy ∈ M ∩ [y(A) → y(A)). Thus, g ∈ M(idy(A)), and since idy(A) ⊆ x ◦ y
−1,
then g ∈M(x ◦ y−1). Then, gx◦y−1 = x◦y
−1◦g◦y◦x−1 = x◦y−1◦y◦f◦y−1◦y◦x−1 =
x ◦ f ◦ x−1 = fx ∈M, and f ∈M(x).
Corollary 1. Let x and y be two representations of a set A. Then, x and y are
computationally equivalent if and only if x ◦ y−1 and y ◦ x−1 are computationally
equivalent to idy(A) and idx(A) respectively.
Proof. x and y are computationally equivalent if and only if x ⊆ y and y ⊆ x.
x ⊆ y if and only if idx(A) ⊆ y ◦ x
−1 and y ⊆ x if and only if idy(A) ⊆ x ◦ y
−1.
On the other hand, let f ∈ [y(A) → y(A)), f ∈ M(x ◦ y−1) if and only if
fx◦y−1 = x ◦ y
−1 ◦ f ◦ y ◦ x−1 ∈M. Because fx◦y−1 ∈ [x ◦ y
−1(A)→ x ◦ y−1(A)) ⊂
[x(A) → x(A)), then this implies that fx◦y−1 ∈M(idx(A)). Now, x ⊆ y if and only
if idx(A) ⊆ y ◦ x
−1, and then fx◦y−1 ∈ M(y ◦ x
−1), if and only if (fx◦y−1)y◦x−1 =
y ◦ x−1 ◦ fx◦y−1 ◦ x ◦ y
−1 = y ◦ x−1 ◦ x ◦ y−1 ◦ f ◦ y ◦ x−1 ◦ x ◦ y−1 = f ∈ M, and
thus f ∈M(idy(A)).
Symmetrically prove that for every f ∈ [x(A) → x(A)), f ∈ M(y ◦ x−1)
implies f ∈M(idx(A)).
According to these theorems improvements in representation of any abstract
set come through changes internal to the tape representation, a change in the way
the tapes are written. Conversely, every change that represents an improvement
in the space of representation corresponds to an improvement in the representa-
tion of the abstract set. This theorem allows us to push all considerations about
representation improvement to within the space of tapes, independently of the
properties of the set that we are representing.
Remark 7: It is important to note that all relations between representations are
relative to their use qua representations of a specific set. So, when we state that
3 Formally fx = fa′ , a function in a
′(A). Nevertheless, we use two different symbols
because the interpretation of the two functions is not the same: fa′ is a representation
of f , while fx is a representation of fa.
Representation and Computability 17
idy(A) ⊆ x ◦ y
−1, the relation holds only when the representations are intended
as representations of the set y(A). If we consider them as representation of a
different set (for example of a set B ⊂ A), the relation may fail to hold.
For example, in lemma 2 we proved that all representations of finite sets are
computationally equivalent. This, and the fact that there exist endorepresenta-
tions of T which are not computationally equivalent to the identity would seem
to lead us to a contradiction. We could, the argument would go, strictly improve
a representation of a finite set by using this improvement in the set of tapes.
However, these endorepresentations of T which are not computationally equiv-
alent to the identity as representations of T are computationally equivalent to
the identity as representations of the finite set.
* * *
5 Representations and the Turing hierarchy
5.1 Oracles
Given a set of tapes Q, an oracle for Q is the characteristic function for Q. A
TM with oracle Q, φQe is a TM with one additional operation: given a tape τ ,
the operation produces ν if τ ∈ Q, and o if τ 6∈ Q. Note that, as in the standard
definition, it is easy to implement Q as an additional infinite tape that in the
position #τ has a “1” if τ ∈ Q and a “0” otherwise.
Given a set A, a representation x of A, and a set N ⊆ A, an x-oracle for N is
a function that, given the tape x(n), produces ν if n ∈ N , and o otherwise; that
is, it is an oracle for x(N) inside x(A). The TM φNe with oracle N is defined in
the obvious way.
Given a set Q ⊂ T we shall indicate with MQ the set of functions on tapes
computable using an oracle for Q. Analogously, given a representation a of A,
and a set N ⊆ A, we shall indicate with MN (a) the set of functions in [A1 → A2]
for some A1, A2 ⊂ A which are computable with an x-oracle for N .
Definition 18. Given two sets B,C ⊆ A and a representation x of A, B is
x-computable in C if χB ∈M
C(x).
Consider a representation x of a set A such that x(A) is computationally
enumerable. Then, any set C ⊆ A is trivially computable using an x-oracle for
C, and as such, it is computationally enumerable using an x-oracle for C. Use
this enumerator to provide a standard numbering #Cx of C. Note that even if
C is always computable using an x-oracle for C, it need not be computationally
enumerable if x(A) is not computationally enumerable.
Definition 19. Let A,C be two infinite countable sets with C ⊂ A. Let x be a
computationally enumerable representation of A. The Turing jump of C in the
representation x is
C′x =
{
c ∈ C|φC#Cx (c)(x(c))↓
}
(22)
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The definition, per se, would not require that C be countable nor infinite,
but the infinite and countable case is the one for which all the interesting results
are derived so, rather than adding the restriction to the discussions that follow,
we have preferred to make it explicit in the definition.
Theorem 8. C′x is not x-computable in C.
Proof. Let EC ∈ [C → C] be the enumerator of C. Suppose C′x has a computable
characteristic function with x-oracle C, χC′x
C ; define fC ∈ [C → C] such that
fCx(x(c)) =
{
EC x(φ
C
#xC(c)(x(c))) if χC′x
C(c) = ν
o if χC′x
C(c) = o
(23)
then fC ∈ MC(x). Thus, we know that there exists c0 ∈ C such that for all
c ∈ C, φC#xC(c0)(x(c))↓ and f
C
x(x(c)) = φ
C
#xC(c0)(x(c)) but, for all c such that
φC#xC(c)(x(c))↓, f
C
x(x(c)) = E
C
x(φ
C
#xC(c)(x(c))) 6= φ
C
#xC(c)(x(c)). In particu-
lar, φC#xC(c0)(x(c0))↓, and so f
C
x(x(c0)) 6= φ
C
#xC(c0)(x(c0)). This contradiction
proves that C′x must be not x-computable in C.
Definition 20. We shall say that C ≤x B if C is x-computable in B, and that
C ≡x B if C ≤x B and B ≤x C. We define
degx(C) = [C]≡x = {B|B ≡x C} (24)
also, we set
∅
(n)
x = {a|φ
∅(n−1)x
#x(a) (x(a))↓} (25)
where ∅(0) = ∅ is a computable set. Also, set
0
(n)
x = degx(∅
(n)
x ) (26)
In the following, we shall indicate with c the standard representation of N,
that in which the number n is represented as n+1 symbols “1” followed by one
“0”. Then 0c = 0, the degree of standard computable sets, and
0c ≤c 0
′
c ≤c 0
′′
c ≤c · · · ≤c 0
(n)
c ≤c · · · (27)
is the standard Turing hierarchy. On the other hand, each representation x in-
duces a hierarchy
0x ≤x 0
′
x ≤x 0
′′
x ≤x · · · ≤x 0
(n)
x ≤x · · · (28)
5.2 Representation hierarchy
Representations and their hierarchies have a connection with the Turing hierar-
chy. Let χ
(n)
x be the characteristic function of the set ∅
(n)
x , and c the standard
representation. Define the class of representations u(k) : N→ T as
u(k)(n) = 〈c(χ
(k)
c (n)), . . . , c(χ
′
c(n)), c(n)〉 (29)
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We have u(k−1) = pi2 ◦ u(k), therefore u(k−1)  u(k); on the other hand, χ
(k)
c
is computable in u(k), but not in u(k−1), so u(k) 6
t
∼ u(k−1). We can consider
the equivalence classes [u(k)] t
∼
. Clearly, if x
t
∼ y it is M(x) = M(y), so the set
M([u(k)] t
∼
) is well defined, and within it are the set of characteristic functions
of sets which are computable by the class of representations transformationally
equivalent to u(k). We call this the representation degree of u(k):
u(k) = rdg(u(k)) = M([u(k)] t
∼
) (30)
Lemma 4.
u(k) ⊆ 0(k) (31)
Proof. Let f ∈ u(k) ; then there is a TM φ such that, for each n ∈ N, (u(k)◦f)(n) =
(φ◦u(k))(n). Consider a tape with the representation c(n). Since (trivially) χ
(k)
c ∈
0(k), there is a TM with oracle ∅(k) that can compute χ
(k)
c and, by the transitivity
of the relation ≤c, there are TM with oracle ∅(k) that can compute ∅′, . . . , ∅(k−1);
the bijection 〈,〉 is also computable, therefore there is a TM φ∅(k) with oracle
∅(k) that, given c(n) can compute u(k)(n). Applying φ∅(k) followed by φ we can
compute f with oracle ∅(k).
The following property derives trivially from the observation that χ
(k)
c ∈ u(k) ,
but χ
(k)
c 6∈ 0(k−1)
Lemma 5.
u(k) − 0(k−1) 6= ∅ (32)
So, there is a hierarchy of representations that in a sense mirrors the Turing
hierarchy. One question that comes naturally is whether this hierarchy corre-
sponds to an effective increase in computing power. The following results will
allow us to answer this question.
Theorem 9. Let x and y be two representations of a set A, with x ⊆ y. Then,
if x(A) is c.e. so is y(A).
Proof. Let x|A ∈ [A → x(A)]; note that x is injective and therefore x
−1 exists in
x(A). The set x(A) is c.e., therefore there are e′ ∈ [x(A) ։ x(A)] and τ0 ∈ x(A)
such that for each τ ∈ x(A) there is k such that τ = e′k(τ0).
Consider now the function q = x−1 ◦ e′ ◦ x|A ∈ [A → A]. It is obvious that
given u0 = x
−1(τ0) and u ∈ A it is u = qk(u0) where k is the number such that
x(u) = e′k(τ0). That is, q is an enumerator of A and e
′ = qx.
By a similar argument, it can be seen that e = y◦q◦y−1 = qy is an enumerator
of y(A) and, since q is computable in x and x ⊆ y, q is also computable in y,
that is, e is computable. Therefore y(A) is not only c.e., but also with the same
enumeration function (in A) as x(A).
Theorem 10. Let x and y be two representations of a set A. If x ⊆ y and x(A)
is c.e. then x
t
∼ y
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Proof. From theorem 9 we know that y(A) is also c.e. and that there is an
enumerator e of A that is computable in both representations, that is, e ∈
M(x) ∩M(y).
Let us begin by showing that y  x; in order to do this, we must find a com-
putable function f such that y = f ◦ x. Let a ∈ A, and x(a) its x-representation.
If a0 is the start value of e, initialize two tapes with x(a0) and y(a0), then simu-
late the two TM that compute ex and ey until we reach an iteration i such that
eix(x(a0)) = x(a), then e
i(a0) = a, and e
i
y(y(a0)) = y(a), that is, on the second
tape we have the y-representation of a. We therefore have a TM that computes
f .
In a similar way we can build a TM that computes g such that x = g ◦ y.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of the definition of equivalence
by transformability
Lemma 6. Let x and y be two representations of A; if x
t
∼ y then x
c
∼ y.
Note, however, that equivalence is necessary here. It is generally not true
that if x  y then x ⊆ y nor y ⊆ x. The intuitive idea is that transformability
gives us a one way translation capability, but in order to compute we need to
translate both ways, to represent and to interpret.
From these results, we easily derive the following theorem:
Theorem 11. Let x and y be two representations of A; if x(A) and y(A) are
c.e. then either x
t
∼ y or x||y.
The proof of all these properties boils down in practice to the possibility of
computing an enumerator of A. We can therefore formulate the previous result
in the following guise:
Theorem 12. Let A be a set with an enumerator e, and let x and y be two
representations of A; then if e ∈M(x) and e ∈M(y), then x
t
∼ y.
The proven results effectively prevent the creation of a hierarchy of degrees
based on representations. Consider the two representations u and u′: they are
representations of N, which is c.e. under u so it is not u ⊆ u′, and it is not u′ ⊆ u,
since χ′c is computable in u
′ but not in u. Therefore, u||u′–that is, in order to
gain the possibility of computing χ′c, we must give up the computability of some
of the functions that are computable in u. Specifically, we lose the possibility of
computing the iterator itself: given u′(n) = 〈c(χ′c(n)), c(n)〉, we can’t compute
u′(n+ 1) = 〈c(χ′c(n+ 1)), c(n+ 1)〉.
On the other hand, the theorem doesn’t tell us anything about the other
degrees of the hierarchy, since none of the range u(k)(N), k ≥ 1 are c.e. and
none of them allows the computation of the iterator. This leads to the idea of
“relativizing” the properties seen so far through the use of TMs with oracles.
Let MR(x) be the set of functions that can be computed in a representation x
using a TM with oracle R. A set Q ⊆ T is computationally enumerable in R
(R-c.e.) if its enumerator can be implemented by a TM with oracle R.
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Definition 21. A representation y is R-better than x (x ⊆
R
y) if MR(x) ⊆
MR(y); the equivalences x
c
∼
R
y, x
t
∼
R
y and the incomparability x||
R
y are defined in
the obvious way.
The following theorem can be proved in the same way as the preceeding
theorems, simply by replacing all TMs with a TM with the suitable oracle.
Theorem 13. Let x and y be two representations of a set A with x ⊆
R
y; if x(A)
is R-c.e. then:
i) y(A) is R-c.e.;
ii) x
t
∼
R
y;
iii) x
c
∼
R
y.
From this we derive
Theorem 14. Let x and y be two representations of a set A, then
i) if x(A) and y(A) are R-c.e., then either x
t
∼
R
y or x||
R
y;
ii) if A is R-c.e. with enumerator e, ex ∈MR(x) and ey ∈MR(y), then x
t
∼
R
y.
Consider now the representations u(k) and u(k+1); note that χ(k+1) ∈M∅
k
(u(k+1)),
but χ(k+1) 6∈M∅
k
(u(k)), so u(k) 6
c
∼
∅k
u(k+1). On the other hand the enumerator of
∅(k) is computable in u(k), therefore, it must be u(k) ||
∅k
u(k+1).
* * *
6 Church-Turing thesis
The Church-Turing thesis is arguably one of the most famous statements in com-
putability theory. The notion of representation in the Turing machine formalism
and its properties, suggest us a new point of view on the Church-Turing thesis,
one that we hope may lead us to a better understanding of it by seeing it in a
somewhat different light. In a nutshell, the Church-Turing thesis states that the
notion of computability in any formalism essentially corresponds to that defined
by Turing machines. The thesis’ name is due to Turing’s work on providing ev-
idence that this thesis was most likely true. More precisely, Turing provided a
proof in his classic paper [18] that Turing machines and λ-calculus (defined by
Church [3]) were equivalent.
There are two clarifications to be made vis-a-vis the Church-Turing thesis
and related ideas. On the one hand, there is a reason for which Church-Turing
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thesis is thus named. Church-Turing thesis talks about the intuitive notion of
computability, and thus it is not a mathematical statement which can be proven.
One can only provide evidence that suggests that any reasonable model of com-
putability is equivalent to Turing machines. On the other hand, the Church-
Turing thesis, even if considered true (in its informal sense), still does not provide
an unambiguous definition of whether a given mathematical function (alterna-
tively, set) is computable or it is not. The reason for this is that all existing
mathematical models for computation are defined using representative but spe-
cific sets (strings or tapes for Turing machines, lambda functions for λ-calculus,
natural numbers for (primitive) recursive functions...). Using these formalisms
to consider whether a function outside the formalism is computable or it is not
requires a process of representation of external elements into the formalism.
This makes our consideration on representations relevant vis-a-vis the Church-
Turing thesis.
Property 1:
For each possible mathematical set, there exists a choice of representation
which makes that set computable.
The representation choice is analogue to the one provided in example 2. This
fact prevents us from giving an absolute statement about the computability of
functions outside of formalisms. In the case of Turing machines, we can only
give absolute results for functions defined on tapes, in the case of λ-calculus for
functions on λ-expressions, and so on. This makes it impossible to compare, in
absolute terms, two formalisms, as they operate on different sets.
The Turing equivalence theorem, on the other hand, is a formal compari-
son of two formalisms, each taking as operating on a different set. In light of
the apparent ambiguity that representations give to the concept of computable
function, the question then becomes: What kind of equivalence exists between
the Turing machine formalism and the λ-calculus formalism? The equivalence
provided by Turing’s theorem is structural : it shows that the set of Turing-
computable functions (which are functions on strings or tapes) and the set of
computable functions in λ-calculus (which are functions on lambda functions)
are isomorphic.
In order to provide a full statement of the theorem, then, it would be nec-
essary to specify what kind of structure they are equivalent under. This is not
explicitly stated in the original Turing theorem, since the equivalence is proven
by showing the somehow obvious equivalence of the basic functions and using
operations such as composition to build the two isomorphic sets of computable
functions in both formalisms4. Looking at the details of the proof, the structure
4 It could be argued that the reason these precisions were not considered by Turing
is simply because he was not interested at the moment in doing these abstract
considerations, but rather was more concerned with the computability of certain
functions on natural numbers with respect to the basic arithmetic operations.
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for which the equivalence is proven can be given explicitly. The basic operations
are considered equivalent because they are undistinguishable in set-theoretic
terms. This corresponds to the notions of injectivity (cardinality) and compos-
ability, and derived ones. That is, there is a bijection between strings or tapes
and λ-functions such that for each computable function and each subset, the
cardinalities of the images and preimages are preserved (if one string can be
obtained from two possible different strings applying a certain Turing machine,
then the corresponding lambda function must be obtainable from two different
λ-functions applying the corresponding lambda function, etc); and at the same
time, composability is preserved (if Turing machines f and g are composed, the
resulting Turing machine corresponds to the λ-function resulting from composing
those corresponding to f and g).
This is not different from any other mathematical structure. For instance,
sets are not group-isomorphic until they are given a group structure, and so long
as cardinalities (set-theoretic structure) correspond, any two sets can be made
group-isomorph by making the right choice of group structure. Computability is
usually only considered for countable sets, so cardinality is not an issue. These
considerations allow us to restate Property 1 in the following guise.
Property 2:
For each possible mathematical set, there exists a choice of a computation
formalism which is structurally equivalent to Turing machines such that
the set is computable in such formalism.
This is somewhat the heart of the issue of representations. A change of rep-
resentation and a change of formalism are two faces of the same coin: com-
putability, the same way as groups, rings, vector spaces or any other algebraic
structure, only can be endowed with after we have specified what structure we
are working in. Thus, the usual notion of computability of problems of natural
numbers corresponds to a computability structure specified on natural numbers
and which relates to its ring structure in a particular way, namely, in that it
enables the computation of the successor function. Other equivalent but incom-
patible structures could be considered on the same set, providing an equivalent
to considering different representations of natural numbers.
7 Some Concluding Remarks
A Turing machine is an abstract device that implements syntactic functions, that
is, functions that transform finite sequences of symbols on a tape into sequences
of symbols on the same tape. We have shown that using this formalism to define
the computability of functions specified on arbitrary sets requires a process of
representation that cannot, a priori, be ignored. The same happens with any
other model of computability that is defined on a representative set, such as
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λ-functions for λ-calculus, recursive functions or natural numbers for register
machines.
The way these formalisms are defined is historically motivated by the resem-
blances they exhibit with the mental and physical processes carried by a mathe-
matician when working on a problem using pen and paper. This metaphor makes
the computability of certain functions and operators evidently desirable: com-
position and partial application of computable functions, computability of the
identity function and of a comparator function. While the computability of an
enumerator is intuitively assumed, it is not derivable from the other properties
in a general computability model, and it is generally not included as an addi-
tional axiom for the model. We have shown that there are theoretical reasons
that compel the inclusion of the computability of an enumerator as an addi-
tional axiomatic capability of common computability models or, alternatively,
of the representations carried when using these models. Theorem 12 of this pa-
per proves that any computability model with the usually assumed properties
can never be more powerful than another one with the same properties plus
enumerability.
This result, however, gives rise to new questions. The central one is related
to the fact that there are uncountably many enumerators of a countable set,
and that they are obviously not all equivalent. When we are not thinking of a
specific purpose for our computability model, there is no principled reason to
favour the use of one of these enumerators over others. This creates a whole
(uncountable) set of possible computability models over the same set, all of
them mutually incomparable. As an example, consider two representations of
the cartesian product of Turing machines and input tapes. The first one is the
usual representation used for the classical universal Turing machine, and it al-
lows the computation of the typical enumerator of Turing machines and tapes,
and thus is a computationally enumerable representation. The second one allows
the computation of another enumerator which enumerates Turing machines and
tapes in a way such that odd numbers correspond to halting Turing machines
and tapes, while even numbers correspond to non-halting Turing machines and
tapes. Inside each of these subsets, the machines are enumerated using the enu-
meration provided in the first representation. As we showed, the implementation
of this enumeration using a representation is trivial, as it is on the mapping func-
tion, outside all formalism, where we can include all the ”magic” necessary. So
much that in practice, the Turing machine implementing both enumerators can
actually be the same one (the general enumerator of tapes). It is obvious that
these two enumerators are incomparable, since the latter allows the computation
of the halting problem while the former does not, while both being computa-
tionally enumerable, and the proven theorem can then be applied to prove the
incomparability.
The kind of problems that we want to solve, or more generally, the kind
of mathematical structure for which we want to create a computability model
(e.g., natural numbers with successor function) will indicate which enumera-
tor we should use. We can see this as thinking that instead of considering the
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absolute computability of arbitrary abstract functions, we can consider their co-
computability (or co-decidability respectively for set membership). For example,
no computability model for natural numbers that allows the computation of
addition also allows the computation of the halting problem (as typically for-
mulated for natural numbers): these problems are incompatible. The general
Turing jump definition included in the text generalizes the halting theorem’s
traditional statement that there are absolutely incomputable problems over rep-
resentations to provide a new statement that in any representation, there are
some incomputable problems.
We have also shown that the structure of the family of models generated by
changes in representations is inherently different from that provided by oracle
machines. While the introcuction of oracles strictly increases the computation
power of a model, a change of representation is not guaranteed to increase or
even retain its computation power. Moreover, while oracle machines cannot be
produced simply by cleverly exploiting the typical definition of Turing machines,
instead requiring an extension on the definitions, representations can. We have
proven that the ”degrees of representation” originated from using representa-
tions are related but not equal to the classical hierarchy of degrees of recursive
unsolvability provided by oracle machines.
In the section on the Church-Turing thesis we suggest that computability
could be defined as a mathematical structure rather than as a representative
model defined on a representative set, thus transforming the problem of repre-
sentation into a problem of specifying the appropriate structure in the repre-
sented set. We believe that this approach is more in line with the usual work in
mathematics, while at the same time avoiding some ambiguities and apparent
uncertainties present when using models such as Turing machines or λ-calculus.
We believe that trying to define this algebraic structure in the same terms as
groups, vector fields or topological spaces is a promising direction for future
work.
Finally, a very promising line of future work is the study of the relation be-
tween representation and computational complexity. For example, while multi-
plication of integers represented in unary is an O(n2) problem and an O(log2(n))
problem in binary, if we represent integers by their decomposition in prime fac-
tors, it becomes an O(1) problem, however making addition a potentially expo-
nential problem. We believe that a generic approach to the problem of the effect
of representation on complexity under an abstract formalism similar to the one
proposed in this text could be useful and possibly provide new directions for
work on usual problems in complexity.
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